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ABSTRACT
The paper deals with the e.ects of cohabitation of grown children with their parents on household
saving, using data from Italy and the Netherlands. It presents a two-period gametheoretical model
where the child has to decide whether to move out of the parental home. This decision is affected
by transaction costs, the child’s preference for independence, and by the consumption loss induced
by the move (consumption is a public good while the child lives in the parental home). We show that
the child’s income share affects the household saving decision, in contrast with predictions of the
standard unitary model of household decision making. Empirical results from both countries are
supportive of the key model predictions. We find strong positive effects of the child income share
on the saving rate in Italy, where we calculate saving as the di.erence between disposable income and
consumption but cannot distinguish children who will leave from those who will stay. We also find
some significant effects of the child income share on household saving rate in the Netherlands, where
saving is computed as the change over time in financial wealth. In the Dutch data we distinguish
between children who stay and children who leave. The effect of the child’s income share is
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Much economic theory on saving takes the nuclear household as the benchmark for its analysis.
The standard assumption is that children leave home as soon as they are of age, and that they
become independent consumption units as soon as they do so.
Yet, we have evidence of wide-spread cohabitation of at least two generations in some Eu-
ropean countries, as well as in some Far Eastern countries. In these European countries the
common pattern is not so much for the elderly to live with their children, rather for grown
children to leave home well after they become of age. We deﬁne those households where grown
children live with their parents as “composite households”. We provide evidence from Italian
survey data that composite households diﬀer in their saving behavior: for all ages over 50,
composite households’ saving rates are higher than nuclear households’ saving rates. One pos-
sible implication is that countries characterized by higher cohabitation have higher aggregate
household saving.
The economic issue we investigate is the link between cohabitation and saving. But this calls
into questions the reasons behind cohabitation, a topic that has been investigated in a number of
papers, that point to imperfections in either the labour market or in the credit market (possibly
in conjunction with the housing market). For instance, Fogli [14] and Becker et al. [6] stress
the importance of lack of job security for the young in delaying the time of independence, while
Guiso and Jappelli [15] stress that rent controls and severe imperfections in the mortgage market
make it hard for young Italians to move out of the parental home. However, recent work by
Manacorda and Moretti [18] suggests that parental preference for living with their children may
play a major role in explaining cohabitation, to the point that parents would choose to work
harder to oﬀer their grown children a higher standard of living if they remain in the parental
home.
In this paper we show how diﬀerences in saving rates found in micro data can shed light on
the presence and nature of these imperfections or diﬀerences in preferences across generations.
In particular, we want to assess the role played by transaction costs in the housing markets. If
such costs are particularly high for both trading down (by the parents) and buying or renting
(by the children), and capital markets are imperfect, cohabitation may be the optimal way for
the young to accumulate liquid assets necessary for the down payment and in general for the
3purchase of their home.
In the case where parents and grown children live together, household decisions are unlikely
to be taken in a unitary way. Even if father and mother behave as one person, and they have
only one child, key household decisions are likely to be the result of some form of bargaining
between parents and child. For this reason, we extend Browning’s [11] "younger spouse" model
to cover the case of two generations: in his model husband and wife have diﬀerent survival
probabilities, and therefore disagree on how much to save. In our model, the child may choose
to leave home in the second period or to stay with her parents, and will base her saving decision
on the preferred outcome. In either case, we can expect the child’s income share to have an
impact on the household saving rate.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some basic facts on cohabitation
in Europe, and on its consequences on saving rates. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical
model of how composite households jointly decide how much to save and whether to continue
cohabitation. Section 4 describes the two data sets used in this paper: the Italian Survey on
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) and the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP). Section 5
presents estimates for both Italy and the Netherlands, while Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Cohabitation across European Countries
Economists often assume that adult children live on their own. This probably reﬂects the most
common living arrangement that prevails in some Western countries, such as Germany, the UK
or the US, where children tend to leave the parental home soon after they become of age or at
least complete their education. And yet, there is ample evidence that this is by no means the
rule even within Europe. Important studies by demographers have pointed out that the age of
leaving home varies dramatically across European countries (Kiernan, [16] and [17], Fernández
Cordón [13]). In a recent and well-documented study, Billari et al. [7] estimate that for the
10-year cohort born around 1960, for instance, median ages of leaving home were 22.5 for men
and 20.5 for women in the Netherlands (very close to the UK or West Germany), as low as 20.1
for men and 19.8 for women in Lithuania, but much higher in Spain, Poland and particularly
Italy (26.7 for men and 23.6 for women in Italy). This variability across countries is not a recent
4phenomenon, and suggests that institutional or cultural diﬀerences may play a lasting role in
explaining international diﬀerences.
An interesting summary on cohabitation in Europe as recently as 1998 is presented in Figure
1, that shows the proportion of households in the European Community Household Panel headed
by someone aged 50 or more with at least one child aged 25 or more in residence. This proportion
is highest in Portugal, followed by Italy, Ireland and Spain, and lowest in Denmark, followed by
the Netherlands and the UK. 1
 





















Figure 1: Proportion of composite households in European countries
However, even though in the Netherlands cohabitation of children aged 25+ with their par-
ents is quite rare , the cohabitation of 18-25 is much more common. On the basis of this
evidence, it makes sense to study the way cohabitation and saving decisions are taken across
diﬀerent countries but not necessarily to focus on a speciﬁc age group: we shall construct our
empirical exercise in such a way that the leaving home decision could be taken mostly by children
aged 25+ (like in Italy) or 18-25 (like in the Netherlands).
Computing saving rates in household level data is diﬃcult. Saving can be deﬁned as income
minus expenditure, or as the change in wealth. The two deﬁnitions are not even conceptually
the same, because income does not normally include capital gains (see Brugiavini and Weber
[10] for a discussion of this and many other issues). But empirically, they are likely to diﬀer
5for measurement problems too: the ﬂow deﬁnition requires ﬁnding a survey that contains high
quality data on both income and expenditure, the stock-based measure requires good records of
ﬁnancial and real wealth for at least two points in time.
In our empirical work, we shall use both deﬁnitions when possible (Italian data) and the
stock-based measure alone when expenditure data are missing (Dutch data).
We should note that saving rates in SHIW are notoriously high, but even complex corrections
based on statistical matching of complementary data sources for income and expenditure do not
alter the age proﬁle all that much (Battistin, Miniaci and Weber, [5]).
There is evidence that saving rates diﬀer according to household type, as documented in
Brugiavini and Padula [9]. In Figure 2 we show how the average saving rate varies with age
in SHIW 2000, according to the nature of the household (nuclear or composite). The saving
rate is higher for composite households, but the endogenous nature of the child’s decision to
leave home prevents a clear interpretation of this empirical regularity. A point worth noting is
that household saving rates could be higher for composite households because of composition
eﬀects (if better oﬀ, high saving parents induce their children to stay with them) or because the
















Figure 2: Saving rates by nuclear and composite households in Italy
63 Cohabitation and Saving: A Simple Model
In this section we develop a simple model that can help us assess to what extent the diﬀerences
in saving rates found in micro data are due to imperfections in housing and credit markets or
to diﬀerences in preferences across generations. If transaction costs in the housing market are
particularly high for both trading down (by the parents) and buying or renting (by the children),
and capital markets are imperfect, a long period of cohabitation may be the optimal way for
the young to accumulate liquid assets necessary for the down payment and in general for the
purchase of their home.
In our simple model we assume that parents and children live for two periods: in period 1 all
adult children live with their parents. In period 2 some will go and live on their own, some will
remain with their parents. The parents behave as a unit (known as F) ,a n dt h e yp r e f e rt h e i r
children to live with them (this is particularly true for Italy, according to Manacorda Moretti’s
[18] elaborations on World Value Survey data). The children prefer to live on their own, but
they must pay a ﬁxed transaction cost at the moment they leave. This could be a down-payment
for home purchase, or a cash advance on rent or deposit, but it could also be moving expenses
and the costs of getting furniture and basic household appliances. Similar assumptions are made
by Manacorda and Moretti [18], who consider labour supply decisions of the parents in a static
model.2
Crucial to our model is the assumption that individual saving cannot be negative. This is
equivalent to ruling out borrowing not only outside the household, but also within. Borrowing
outside the household is unlikely to be sought by the (middle-aged) parents, whose income is
relatively high, and is unlikely to be granted to the children, whose jobs are typically not secure
(as stressed by Becker et al. [6]). Borrowing within the household may occur if parents want or
are willing to help their children to move out, as argued by Guiso and Jappelli [15]. However,
this help may well be withheld as long as possible, if parents derive utility from cohabitation.
We do not model this further aspect of the inter-generational game, but note the potential
importance of a strategic use of transfers from parents to children to delay independence.
We assume there is only one child for convenience, and labour supply by both parents and
child is exogenous. In the model we further assume certainty. Consumption is a public good
within the parents’ household, but it becomes private if the child leaves home. The issue is of
7how household saving is aﬀected by the possibility that the child moves out. The child’s decision
to move out is endogenous and will therefore be known for sure in period 1. The model assumes
that parents and child play a Nash game. In the case where the child decides to stay with the
father this leads to a Pareto-eﬃcient solution. In the case where she chooses to move out, this
leads to an ineﬃcient solution (too much saving, because consumption is a public good in period
1, a private good in period 2). Therefore, we shall also consider the cooperative solution for the
case where the child decides to move out.
L e tu sd e n o t ew i t hF the parents variables, with K the child variables. Let P be the amount
saved by the parents, S be the amount saved by the child. Let Y be income (with subscripts
for periods 1 and 2, superscripts F for parents and K for the child - no superscript denotes
the household total: Y1 = Y F
1 + Y K
1 ). Consumption in period 1 is the diﬀerence between total
household income and total saving (Y1 − S − P). Let λ be a 0-1 indicator: λ =1if in period
2 the child remains with her parents, λ =0if she leaves the parents’ home. Let T be the
transaction cost incurred if the child moves out. Finally, the constants x and z are both greater
than unity and denote respectively the preference of the parents for cohabitation and of the
child for independence.
Formally, the parents choose P and the child chooses S and λ so as to maximize their utility
functions that are given by:
UF = U(Y1 − S − P)+λxU(P + S + Y2)+( 1− λ)U(P + Y F
2 ) (1)
UK = U(Y1 − S − P)+λU(P + S + Y2)+z(1 − λ)U(S + Y K
2 − T) (2)
where the budget constraint is already taken into account. Liquidity constraints imply that to-
day’s savings cannot be negative. For the sake of simplicity, we shall use throughout logarithmic
utility, without loss of generality.
In the sequel we are going to ﬁrst show how saving decisions are taken when the child ﬁnds
it advantageous to remain with her parents in the second period, then what saving is in the case
where the child moves out, and ﬁnally discuss the likely determinants of the decision to stay or
move out.
T h ec a s ew h e r eλ =1is chosen by the child is like Browning’s "younger spouse" model (see
[11]), because consumption is a public good in both periods but one agent (the parents) values
8future consumption more than the other. Thus in the Nash equilibrium the parents will be the
one to save ﬁrst. In this case, we can work out the dictatorial solutions for parents and child,
and get:








and we see that, if x>1 then (P + S)F > (P + S)K. As in Browning [11] we can establish the
following two lemmas:
Lemma 1: The saving functions of parents (P(S))a n dc h i l d( S(P))are given by:
S(P) = max[min(Y k
1 ,(P + S)k − P),0]
P(S) = max[min(Y F
1 ,(P + S)F − S),0]
Lemma 2: Either the parents save all of their income (Y F





Then we can establish the following
Proposition 1:
(a) The parents save all of their income if
Y F
1 < (S + P)F ⇒ P =( 1− ρ)Y1
where ρ is the child’s share in period 1 income. Otherwise:
P =( S + P)F
(b) The child saves none of her income if
Y F
1 > (S + P)K
9and otherwise saves:
S =( S + P)K − Y F
1
(c) total household saving is therefore given by the following:
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The proposition implies that income distribution within the family aﬀects total household saving,
at least for an intermediate income range, whenever the child chooses to live with her parents
in both periods. Not surprisingly, in this region a higher income share of the parents increases
saving.
The case where λ =0is less straightforward. If the child decides to move out of her parents’
place, period-two consumption is a private good for both agents. The Nash solution can be
found as the intersection of reaction functions, at least over a certain income range. The two
reaction functions are easily derived as follows:
P =


















where the non-negativity constraints have been ignored, as well as the constraint that each









(Y1 − Y F
2 )) (7)
P =










(Y1 − Y F
2 )) (8)
and the sum of the two simpliﬁes to the following expression:
10P + S =
(1 + z)Y1 + T − Y K




and this does not depend on period 1 income distribution within the household. However, this
interior solution does not hold for all possible income values.
We can establish that parents save less than the child as long as period 1 household income is
suﬃciently large compared to parents’ income in period 2 and child’s income net of transaction
cost. This condition seems reasonable in view of the fact that Y1 subsumes initial wealth of both
agents.
Then the interesting case to investigate is the one where Y K
1 <S . In this case the child
saves all of her income, whereas the parents saves according to equation (5), that is:
P =








(1 − ρ)Y1 − Y F
2
2
and total household saving is:
P + S =














In this case, total household saving is positively aﬀected by ρ, the child’s share in period 1
income. However, this outcome is not Pareto-eﬃcient, because there is more saving than any
collective solution would imply (period 1 consumption is a public good, period 2 consumption
is private, so the two agents under-provide the public good and save more than in the eﬃcient
solution).
The child can work out whether her utility is higher under cohabitation or under inde-
pendence. The preference for independence (represented by the z p a r a m e t e ri ne q u a t i o n( 2 ) )
will push her to leave home; the transaction cost and her parents’ preference for cohabitation
(represented by the x parameter in equation (1)) will instead act in the opposite direction.
We can work out what the Pareto-eﬃcient solution will be in the case of independence. This
will serve us as a benchmark to assess the welfare loss associated to the non-cooperative solution
of equation (9), but is also interesting because it is the relevant solution if the two generations
decide to cooperate (as argued in much of the recent literature on household decision making,
see Vermeulen (2003)). In the case where λ =0the eﬃcient solution can be found by choosing
11P and S so as to maximize the following criterion function:
Uµ = U(Y1 − S − P)+µU(P + Y F
2 )+z(1 − µ)U(S + Y K
2 − T) (10)
where µ is the Pareto-weight attached to the parents’ utility. This will normally be a decreasing
function of ρ, the child’s share in period 1 income, as individual incomes aﬀect the fall-back
position of the Nash bargaining solution. Of course µ can also be a function of other exogenous
characteristics.




1+µ + z(1 − µ)
[(1 − µ)z(Y1 + Y F
2 ) − (1 + µ)(Y K
2 − T)] (11)
ˆ P =
1
1+µ + z(1 − µ)
[µY1 − (1 + z(1 − µ))Y F
2 + µ(Y K
2 − T)] (12)
and total household saving is:
ˆ S + ˆ P =
1
1+µ + z(1 − µ)
[((1 − µ)z + µ)Y1 − Y F
2 − (Y K
2 − T)] (13)
We can see that if z =1total household saving does not depend on µ or on how income is
allocated in period 1. This simply says that if the two agents agree the cooperative solution is
unique and independent of the Pareto weights.
The interesting case is when z>1, that is when the child values independence more. Let us
deﬁne ξ = z − 1 and write the solution as a function of ξ:
ˆ S + ˆ P =
1
2+ξ(1 − µ)
[(1 + ξ(1 − µ))Y1 − Y F
2 − (Y K
2 − T)]
and we easily check that its derivative with respect to µ is negative as long as ξ is positive and
total period 2 household income exceeds the transaction cost. Both conditions are easily met.
If µ i sad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o ni nρ (the parents’ Pareto weight is smaller when the child has
more income), this implies that a higher period 1 income share of the child increases household
saving.
To summarize, we have found the following:
12• the child is more likely to move out if the transaction cost is low and if her preference for
independence is high. Also the parents’ preference for cohabitation may have a negative
eﬀect if the parents’ period 1 income is suﬃc i e n t l yh i g h( s e ep r o p o s i t i o n3 )
• if the child decides to stay home, a higher period 1 income share for her either has no
eﬀect on household saving, or a negative eﬀect
• if the child decides to leave home, and parents and child play a Nash game, then a higher
period 1 income share for the child either has no eﬀect on household saving, or a positive
eﬀect. However, the Nash game leads in this case to a Pareto ineﬃcient solution
• if the child decides to leave home, and parents and child play a cooperative game instead,
then a higher period 1 income share for the child has again a positive eﬀect.
Similar eﬀects of period 1 child’s income share are found for the saving rate.
The case where the child prefer cohabitation, and parents would like her to leave home,
can to an extent be modeled by making x and z less than unity. But, given the presence of
transaction costs and other penalties attached to living on her own (loss of public consumption),
the child will never leave her parental home, unless forced to or bribed by her parents. This
suggests that in this case the assumption of no inter-vivos tranfers is clearly not tenable (after
all, most children leave home eventually!). A more general model is needed that is beyond the
scope of this paper.
The main conclusions of our model are unaﬀected if the child living with her parents can
spend money on a private consumption good, as long as she also consumes some of the public
good.
4T h e D a t a
In this paper we use household survey data from two European countries: Italy and the Nether-
lands. The micro data we use are taken from SHIW for Italy, from SEP for the Netherlands and
are described in the rest of this section.
As ﬁgure (1) reveals, in Italy over 30% of households whose head is over 50 have at least one
child aged 25 or more in residence. In the Netherlands this proportion is much smaller (less than
135%), but in recent years there has been an increase in the number of young Dutch (aged 18-24)
who live with their parents, possibly because of increased house prices and rents or decreased
welfare beneﬁts for young people.
The workings of housing and credit markets are quite diﬀerent in the two countries, as
documented in Chiuri and Jappelli (2000): for instance, over the 1986-96 decade in Italy the
ratio of outstanding mortgage debt to GDP was a meager 5.30%, whereas in the Netherlands the
same ratio was 43.29%. According to the same source, over the 1990-95 period the downpayment
ratio was 40% in Italy, 25% in the Netherlands (it is now lower in both countries, but still higher
in the Netherlands than in Italy). Housing rental markets are heavily regulated in both countries,
thus making it hard for outsiders to ﬁnd rented accommodation However, University and Local
Authorities housing exists in the Netherlands to am u c hl a r g e re x t e n tt h a ni nI t a l y ,s ot h a ts i n g l e
young people have a reasonable chance of ﬁnding an apartment to rent as long as they do not
plan to live in a town other than their own or their University’s.
To assess the extent to which renting is more widespread among the young in the Nether-
lands than in Italy, in Table 1 we show the proportion of individuals in diﬀerent types of living
arrangements in the two countries. The Table shows that young Dutch typically rent (partic-
ularly in the 20-24 age range) and then move on to purchasing their home (in the 30-34 age
range almost 70% are home owners). Italians instead not only move out at later ages, but also
make less use of rented accommodation early on. However, at a later stage (between 30 and 39
years of age), the fractions of renters and owners are of comparable size, while home-ownership
prevails past age 40.
4.1 The Italian Data: SHIW
The Italian Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) is run by Bank of Italy, and
documented in a number of papers. The primary purpose of SHIW is to collect detailed data
on demographics, households’ consumption, income and balance sheets. The SHIW surveys a
representative sample of the Italian resident population. From 1987 onward the survey has been
conducted every other year (with one exception) and covers about 8,000 households, deﬁned as
groups of individuals related by blood, marriage or adoption and sharing the same dwelling.
The most recent wave of SHIW was conducted in the spring of 2003, and contains information
on 2002. However, SHIW contains a rotating panel component: for instance, about half the
14Table 1: Living arrangements by age
Italy NL
Age WithParents Own Rent With Parents Own Rent
16 − 19 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.04
20 − 24 0.96 0.02 0.02 0.57 0.13 0.30
25 − 29 0.82 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.49 0.39
30 − 34 0.49 0.27 0.24 0.02 0.69 0.29
35 − 39 0.22 0.44 0.34 0.02 0.76 0.22
40 − 44 0.12 0.56 0.32 0.01 0.75 0.24
45 − 49 0.05 0.64 0.31 0.01 0.72 0.27
50 − 54 0.05 0.72 0.22 0.00 0.70 0.30
55 − 59 0.02 0.77 0.21 0.00 0.70 0.29
60 − 64 0.01 0.79 0.19 0.00 0.65 0.35
65 − 69 0.00 0.79 0.21 0.00 0.48 0.52
70 − 74 0.00 0.74 0.26 0.00 0.45 0.55
75 − 79 0.00 0.72 0.28 0.00 0.32 0.68
80+ 0.00 0.65 0.35 0.00 0.26 0.74
152002 sample had already taken part in the 2000 survey, and this is the sample we use. The net
response rate (the ratio of responses to families contacted net of ineligible units) in 2000-2002
was 74.5 percent. See Brandolini and Cannari [8] for more details on the survey.
In this survey saving can be computed in two diﬀerent ways: The standard ﬂow deﬁnition
as disposable income minus expenditure, and the change in wealth deﬁnition. These two def-
initions are not conceptually the same: the former typically excludes capital gains, that may
be particularly relevant in the case of real wealth, but also risky ﬁnancial wealth (stocks and
shares), the latter does include capital gains, but does not distinguish between various forms
of wealth, that may diﬀer in liquidity and fungibility . Further diﬀerences may be tracked to
the way information is collected: expenditure records are based on recall questions, and thus
typically underestimated; ﬁnancial wealth is also under-reported in SHIW, and pension wealth
is neglected altogether.3
In SHIW detailed information is available on household members, including their income,
age, education, sex, and relation to the head. However, wealth is considered a household-level
variable, and so is consumption. As for children of the head who do not live with their parents,
all we know is their existence and number. We also have some information on the head’s parents
(such as how far they live, and their education attainment). Wealth is recorded as of the end of
the calendar year, while ﬂows refer to the whole year.
SHIW 2002 has records on 8010 households. In all speciﬁcations, we need to condition on
beginning of period wealth: to do this we must take wealth as recorded in SHIW 2000. Of all
8010 households interviewed in SHIW 2002, 3604 were also present in SHIW 2000. Given our
interest in grown children, we further select the estimation sample according to the following
criteria: the head must be aged 40 years or more and must have at least one child (whether in
residence or not).This leaves 2662 observations. Finally, given that children aged less than 16
are unlikely to move out in the near future, we also drop those households who report having
no children outside and whose oldest child at home is younger than 16 years of age. The ﬁnal
estimation sample contains 2411 observations, 1426 of which have at least one child living at
home.
164.2 The Dutch data: SEP
We use data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP). The SEP is a longitudinal survey admin-
istered by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) consisting of approximately 5,000 households. The
purpose of the SEP is to provide a description of the most important elements of individual and
household welfare and to monitor changes in these elements. The SEP has been launched in
April 1984. The same households were interviewed in October 1984 and then twice a year (in
April and October) until 1989. Since 1990 the survey has been conducted once a year in May.
In this research we mainly use data from the 1994-2001 waves because they contain information
on perceived job security and satisfaction with housing arrangements.
The survey is representative of the Dutch population, excluding those living in special insti-
tutions like nursing homes. In order to arrive at a representative sample, Statistics Netherlands
has applied a two-stage sampling procedure to collect the initial April 1984 sample. In the ﬁrst
stage, municipalities are drawn with probabilities depending on the number of inhabitants (big
cities are drawn with certainty). In the second stage, addresses are selected randomly. All house-
holds present at the selected address are interviewed, up to a maximum of three households. The
initial rate of unit-non response was equal to 50 %. In order to address the problem of sample
attrition, from 1986 onwards Statistics Netherlands regularly adds new households to the SEP.
The yearly attrition rate is equal to about 10 %. In order to keep the sample as representative as
possible, Statistics Netherlands refreshes the sample by replacing those households who have left
the sample by ‘similar’ households. In case of refreshment samples the rate of unit-non-response
is equal to about 65%.
In the October interviews, information has been collected at the respondent level 4 on socio-
economic characteristics, income and labor market participation. The April interviews also
contain information about socio-economic characteristics, but rather than gathering data about
income, since 1987 the April questionnaires have included questions on a wide range of assets
and liabilities. In this paper, we present summary statistics on net worth, ﬁnancial wealth, and
real wealth. Net worth is obtained by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. We also
analyze ﬁnancial wealth holdings. Financial wealth has been deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
net worth on the one hand and housing equity (value of the primary residence plus life insurance
mortgage minus remaining mortgage debt), other real estate and the value of the cars on the
17other hand. Real wealth is deﬁned to be the diﬀerence between net worth and ﬁnancial wealth.
From the 1990 wave onwards, the SEP collects for most income components information on
‘gross income’ of the previous calendar year. Alessie and Kapteyn [1] provide details on how
disposable income can be calculated. The SEP does not contain information on consumption
expenditures. As a result of this, the SEP can only measure saving by taking the ﬁrst diﬀerence
of net worth. This saving measure therefore includes (unrealized) capital gains.
Every respondent (i.e., a person who is at least 16 years old) in the household has to complete
a short questionnaire on assets and liabilities. However, the SEP does not contain information
on cash holdings and on occupational pension wealth. For this study we have removed the
self-employed from the sample because from 1990 onwards no wealth data have been collected
for this group. Financial wealth has been deﬁned as the diﬀerence between net worth on the
one hand and housing equity (value of the primary residence plus life insurance mortgage minus
remaining mortgage debt), other real estate and the value of the cars on the other hand.
To calculate net worth at the household level, we have chosen the following criteria (this refers
to the data after imputation): we exclude observations for which (i) the head of the household
o rt h es p o u s e" r e f u s e st oa n s w e r "o n eo rm o r eq u e stions about their assets or debts; or (ii) at
least one respondent answers with "do not know" to one or more questions about his/her assets
and debt. After removing the self-employed from the sample, it is possible to calculate net
worth for approximately 95% of the households, more than in previous years (samples in the
late 1980s show some evidence of selectivity, as discussed in Alessie, Lusardi and Aldershof [2]).
It appears that item non-response is especially relevant for saving and checking accounts. No
attempts have been made to impute the missing values. It is worth stressing that child ﬁnancial
wealth is (where recorded) mostly positive, with a median value of 1700 Dﬂ (Dutch Guilders.
All monetary values are at 1990 prices. At the time, the exchange rate was 1$= 1.61 Dﬂ)).
Zeros are recorded in only 9% of the cases. For comparison, median household ﬁnancial wealth
in the same sample is 13000 Guilders .
The data set does not contain information on children outside the parental home, but does
follow a large number of households through a relatively long time period. This allows us to
estimate the probability that any child leaves home as a function of both child’s and parents’
characteristics. The selection criterion we adopt is that the child must have been at least 17 years
old in year t (where t = 1994,1995,...,2000). In our sample we have a total of 5102 observations,
18but for only 3015 of these we have valid records of the relevant variables (unfortunately not all
children aged 16 or more accept ﬁlling in their questionnaire). This is a truncated sample by
deﬁnition: in the smaller sample (3015 observations) there are 1257 children, belonging to 894
households. The exit rate (that is: the proportion of children who are at home at t but leave
home at t+1) is higher for women than for men, and is monotonically increasing in age between
17 years of age (when is 7.0%) and 25 (when it peaks at 32%). Absolute numbers of children
who leave home peak at age 18 (126 home leavers), but remain higher than 70 up to age 23.
Relatively few individuals live with their parents past age 25, as already noted in Section 2 (less
than 5% of the 5102 observations correspond to children of such age).
19Table 2: Probability the child leaves home - SEP (3044 observations)
20An interesting exercise involves estimating the probability of leaving home in period (t+1),
conditional on child’s and parents’ characteristics as of period t. Estimation results are presented
in Table 2. In Column (1) we report marginal eﬀects of a Probit speciﬁcation, in column (2)
corresponding eﬀects estimated by OLS (linear probability model). In both cases standard
errors take clustering into account. Column (3) presents a ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation instead,
that is a speciﬁcation that allows for child-speciﬁc intercepts (and relies on time variability for
identiﬁcation).
The Table shows that estimation diﬀerences between columns (1) and (2) are relatively minor.
We shall therefore comment on Column (2) estimates, that are directly comparable to Column
(3). The explanatory variables are divided in two groups: those that relate to the child (upper
panel), and those that relate to either the parents or the head (HH, lower panel)). In the ﬁrst
group, we have age and age squared (the conditional probability peaks at 28 years according to
column 2 estimates), gender (females are 9.6% more likely to leave), the share of child’s income
and ﬁnancial wealth to household income and ﬁnancial wealth (this has a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect according to the linear probability model, positive and insigniﬁcant according to the probit
model), self-reported satisfaction variables on housing and job security. The housing satisfaction
coeﬃcients suggest that children are more likely to leave home if they are dissatisﬁed or somewhat
dissatisﬁed with their housing situation. Small and insigniﬁcant eﬀects are found for those who
are very dissatisﬁed, a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect is estimated for those who are very satisﬁed
(the control group are those who report being satisﬁed). Satisfaction with job security has strong
negative eﬀects if the child is very dissatisﬁed or a bit satisﬁed. Most household variables do
not appear signiﬁcant in columns (1) or (2). Notable exceptions are household income (positive
eﬀect) and the dummies indicating if the ﬁnancial situation has changed over the last 12 months:
minor improvements have a positive eﬀect on the exit probability. Extreme changes do not have
as i g n i ﬁcant impact, though. Column (3) estimates are largely insigniﬁcant but similar to those
in column (2), suggesting that most variability in the data is cross-sectional. An exception is the
coeﬃcient on age. This variable changes meaning in column (3) compared to column (2), given
that ﬁxed eﬀect regressions are similar to regressions in ﬁrst diﬀerences: observations where the
change in age is not one are few, and correspond such major event as divorce or death of a
partner.
215 Estimation Results
The theoretical model presented above suggests that household saving is a function of the child’s
income share. This contrasts with the unitary model, that assumes income pooling. Household
saving should increase with the child’s income share if the child intends to leave her parental
home eventually, decrease otherwise. The same conclusion holds for the saving rate, a more
interesting variable for economic analysis.
In the sequel we present estimation results for the two countries under investigation. Care
should be taken in interpreting results because of diﬀerences between the two samples. For
Italy, we use the 2002 cross section (with information on 2000 wealth) to see how the household
saving rate is aﬀected, among other things, by the child’s income share. We estimate over the
subsample of households with at least one child at home, and correct for endogenous selectivity
using relevant information that is available for all households. Given that we know very little
about children who live on their own (just their total number), the information used to estimate
this probability is at the household level. For the Netherlands, we have no information on the
existence and number of children outside the parental home, but we are able to follow children
over time (7 years at most) as long as they stay with their parents. Notably, we know their
income and their ﬁnancial wealth (wealth is recorded at the household level in the Italian data),
and can therefore consider changes in household wealth as well as in child wealth. Separate
saving rate equations can be estimated for leavers and stayers, after correcting for endogenous
selectivity.
In our empirical exercise on Italian data, we deﬁne the saving rate as the diﬀerence between
disposable income (the sum of net personal incomes by head, spouse and oldest child) and non-
durable consumption, divided by non-durable consumption.5 We model the saving rate in 2002
as a linear function of previously accumulated wealth (measured as total wealth and real wealth
at the end of year 2000), the ages of head and spouse, household composition variables (such as
the total number of household members, including children who left home, the number of resident
household members, the number of resident children aged less than 25, the number of pensioners,
a dummy indicating the presence of the head’s spouse and another indicating whether the oldest
child is a full-time student), by broad regional dummies and by total disposable income (deﬁned
as above). We also add to the explanatory variables the child’s income share variable that is
22computed as the ratio of personal income of the oldest child to total disposable income. This
variable takes a positive value in 729 cases: in particular, income is positive for 54 full time
students (out of 477) and for 675 other children living with their parents (out of 949). We ﬁnd
that in our estimation sample the child’s income share exceeds the 20% mark in 605 cases (out
of 1426). It is worth stressing that we have no information on wealth at the individual level, so
we must take the child’s income as an indicator of total resources available to her.
In the empirical implementation, we also have to address the issue of endogenous sample
selectivity, because our saving rate sample is made of those households with at least one child
in residence. In fact, we do not observe characteristics of children who left their parents’ home,
but for their total number. From our theoretical model we know that saving and cohabitation
decisions are both endogenous and likely to correlate.
For this reason we follow the standard Heckman’s procedure, and model the probability of
observing at least one child living in a household belonging to the estimation sample as a function
of variables that determine saving (except those that refer to resident children) but also of
variables that should only aﬀect the cohabitation decision. We assume that total and per-capita
home size have an eﬀect on this probability, and that the age the parent became independent
(started working) is also relevant. The home size variables capture local housing conditions (thus
the transaction costs of moving out), whereas the age the head became independent captures
the taste for independence by both generations.
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Probability of at 
least one child at 
home 
Total Wealth (2000) /100  -0.0350 -4.5476  0.0480 
  (0.0165)* (0.1974)**  (0.0409) 
Real Wealth (2000) /100  0.0081 4.9267  -0.0395 
  (0.0182) (0.2175)**  (0.0447) 
Head’s Age  -0.0074 -0.1226  -0.0490 
  (0.0043) (0.0518)*  (0.0047)** 
Spouse’s Age  -0.0065 -0.0322  -0.0441 
  (0.0035) (0.0428)  (0.0063)** 
No Spouse  -0.4763 -2.0178  -2.8815 
  (0.2159)* (2.5991)  (0.3883)** 
Total Family Size  0.0568 0.3991  0.1109 
  (0.0189)** (0.2284)  (0.0429)** 
Northern Italy  -0.2503 0.1627  -0.2196 
  (0.0378)** (0.4539)  (0.0756)** 
Central Italy  -0.2280 -0.1265  -0.0303 
  (0.0409)** (0.4896)  (0.0887) 
Number of pensioners  -0.0529 -0.1508  -0.1874 
  (0.0291) (0.3503)  (0.0550)** 
Family Size (resident)  -0.1405 0.1593   
  (0.0241)** (0.2959)   
Total personal income /100  2.3424 1.6441   
  (0.1010)** (1.2110)   
Income share of oldest child  0.2702 -1.2067   
  (0.0752)** (0.9230)   
Number of children <24  0.0411 -0.2686   
  (0.0251) (0.3047)   





Income of Head and Spouse     0.3966 
/100     (0.3037) 
Home size     0.0055 
     (0.0018)** 
Home size/Total Family Size     -0.0142 
     (0.0065)* 
Age Head Started Work     0.0221 
     (0.0087)* 
Constant  0.7203 6.8413  5.1128 
  (0.2590)** (3.1151)*  (0.3863)** 
Mill’s ratio  0.3204 2.6698   
  (0 .1097)**  (1.3331)*   
Observations  1426 1426  2411 
 
Table 3: SHIW Saving rate equations
In Table 3 we report estimation results. The ﬁrst column presents estimates of the saving
rate equation, the third column of the selectivity probability. Consistent standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
The probability of observing at least one child living with the head decreases with the head’s
and spouse’s age and with the number of pensioners, it increases with the total number of
household members (whether present or not). Home size has a positive eﬀect, as well as the
age when the head started working. Per-capita home size (deﬁned as the ratio of home squared
24meters to total household members) has a negative impact on this probability. Wealth and
income variables are instead not signiﬁcant.
The saving rate is negatively aﬀected by beginning of period wealth, by the number of
resident household members and by the student status dummy. Total personal income has a
strong positive eﬀect, and so does the total number of household members. The income share
of the oldest child has a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on the saving rate: an 1% increase in this
share boosts the saving rate by .27%.
This result is in line with the theoretical model presented above, as long as children who live
with their parents intend to leave home eventually.
We also estimated a similar speciﬁcation for a saving rate equation where saving is deﬁned
as the change in ﬁnancial wealth between years 2000 and 2002. This is a noisy measure, and
parameter estimates (reported in column 2 of Table 3) are imprecisely estimated. In particular,
those coeﬃcients that retain signiﬁcance have the same signs as in column 1, but many parameter
estimates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, including those on the two income variables.
25Table 4: SEP Saving Rate Equations
In Table 4 we report parameter estimates of four saving equations for the Dutch SEP data.
The estimation sample is further reduced compared to Table 2 because observations presenting
outliers in the dependent variables have been dropped. The results of the selection probability
26equation are omitted but are very similar to those reported in Table 2. 6
The upper portion of Table 4 contains parameter estimates corresponding to child-level
variables, the lower part to household or HH variables. The dependent variable in columns (1)
and (2) is the change in household ﬁnancial wealth between times (t − 1) and t to household
income over that year: column (1) is estimated over the sample of households where the child
leaves at time (t+1)-o r" leavers" (439 observations in all) ; column (2) over the sample where
the child stays with the parents at (t +1 )-o r" stayers" (2374 observations). The dependent
variable in columns (3) and (4) is the ratio of the change in child ﬁnancial wealth between times
(t − 1) and t to household income over that year. Again, one column refers to leavers, the next
to stayers. In the lower part of the Table we also report coeﬃcients on the selectivity correction
term (the Mill’s ratio), the constant and the number of observations in each group (leavers and
stayers).
The key explanatory variable is the child’s "income" share. In the Dutch data, this is deﬁned
as the ratio of the child’s cash in hand (income plus liquid assets minus debt) to household cash
in hand. In fact, as noted in Section 4, SEP records individual wealth as well as income, and
cash in hand is a better indicator of bargaining power than income. Cash in hand is positive for
the vast majority of the children in our estimation sample (2914 out of 3044 - for comparison,
child income is positive for 2616 observations). The child’s share in cash in hand exceeds the
20% mark in 148 cases when the child is a student, and in 737 cases when the child is not (in
our sample we have 1738 students, and 1306 not students).
Turning our attention to column (1) estimates (leavers), we notice that household income
has a positive eﬀect on the household saving rate, household ﬁnancial wealth a negative eﬀect.
These are the only two coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Household real
wealth also has a positive coeﬃcient, and so does the "income" (more precisely cash in hand)
share of the child, but in both cases the t-statistic is little over unity. Column (2) estimates
(stayers) of household income and ﬁnancial wealth eﬀects are similar (albeit smaller in absolute
terms), while the child’s "income" share is signiﬁcantly negative. This result agrees well with
the model predictions. In neither column are the job-security variables signiﬁcant, suggesting
that this particular motive for precautionary saving is of little consequence for total household
saving.
The third column - child saving rate equation for leavers - has no signiﬁcant coeﬃcient,
27reﬂecting in part the small sample size and the greater variability in the dependent variable.
Column (4) estimates - child saving rate for stayers - are more precise (the sample size is
much larger). Signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are found on the variable indicating that the child is not
working, two job security dummies and ﬁnancial wealth. The coeﬃcient on child’s "income"
share is negative but with an absolute t-ratio of just over unity. Perhaps the most interesting
implication of this second set of estimates is that lack of job security plays a negative role on the
child’s saving rate: compared to the control group (very satisﬁed with job security) all stayers
save less.
The empirical results presented in this Section can be summarized as follow:
1. In the Italian data, the child’s income share has a strong, positive eﬀect on household
saving
2. In the Dutch data, the same variable has a negative eﬀect on household saving if the child
stays with the family at least one more year, it has a positive (but insigniﬁcant) eﬀect if
the child leaves next year.
These results can be reconciled with the theoretical model predictions if we take into ac-
count the institutional diﬀerences across the two countries’ housing and credit markets (already
discussed in Section 4). In Italy renting is not an option for most of the young, and there is a
heavy transaction cost to be borne related to the purchase of housing stock (large down-payment
requirements). In the Netherlands, cheap renting accommodation is available, and the young -
who can also borrow more liberally - typically rent for a few years and then buy their home. The
relatively small transaction cost - particularly for would-be renters - may explain why leavers do
not apparently use their income to save more (even though the point estimate is positive and its
lack of precision is likely due to the small sample size). The negative eﬀect of the child’s income
share for those who stay is also consistent with the notion that the transaction cost is relatively
small: those children who do not leave immediately do not need to start saving up towards their
move, and behave as if they intended to stay with their parents forever.
286C o n c l u s i o n s
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v ea d d r e s s e dt h ei s s u eo fh o wt h es a v i n gr a t ei sa ﬀected by the decision
of young adults to leave the parental home or to stay. This issue is of great relevance in
some Southern European countries, where children stay with their parents well into their late
twenties and early thirties, but is becoming more important in some Central-Northern European
countries, albeit at younger ages (18-24). For this reason this paper uses micro data from a
Southern European country, Italy, and from a Central-Northern country, the Netherlands.
We have developed a two-period game-theoretical model of the joint consumption - cohabita-
tion decision, and found that the household saving rate should be aﬀected by the child’s income
share. Such eﬀect should be positive for children who intend to leave, negative for those who
intend to stay in the parental home. Things that we have not considered in our theoretical
model are uncertainty and multiple periods. Uncertainty in the unitary model implies less sav-
ing when there are more income earners if labor income risk is not fully insurable. This is not
necessarily true in a collective model, as explained by Mazzocco [19] and is not borne out in
estimation. Multiple periods would allow us to distinguish between late leavers and early leavers
(at present, we only consider leavers and stayers). Finally, we have not considered here transfers
from parents to children, or intra-family borrowing.
Empirical results from both countries are supportive of the key model predictions. We ﬁnd
strong positive eﬀects of the child’s income share on the saving rate in Italy, where we are able
to calculate saving as the diﬀerence between disposable income and consumption but only use
cross-sectional variability in estimation (and cannot therefore distinguish leavers from stayers).
We also ﬁnd some signiﬁcant eﬀects of the child’s income share on household saving rate in the
Netherlands, where saving is computed as the change over time in ﬁnancial wealth. In the Dutch
data we observe households over a long time period, and we can therefore distinguish between
stayers and leavers. Interestingly, the eﬀect of the child’s income share is signiﬁcantly negative
for stayers, positive (albeit insigniﬁcant) for leavers.
T h ee v i d e n c ei sb e s te x p l a i n e di fw et a k ei n t oa c c o u n td i ﬀerences in housing and credit
markets across the two countries, implying that transactions costs for children who leave the
parental home are much more important in Italy than in the Netherlands.
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31Endnotes
1. We are grateful to Raﬀaele Miniaci for making this Figure available to us.
2. Barbagli et al. [4] also stress that in Italy leaving parental home late may be the best choice
for children who value independence, but cannot aﬀord to move out without incurring
substantial costs.
3. Brugiavini and Weber [10] discuss some conceptual issues on the deﬁnition of saving;
Battistin, Miniaci and Weber [5] investigate the properties of consumption data based on
recall questions.
4. A respondent is a member of the household who is at least 16 years old.
5. The saving rate here is deﬁned as Y −C
C (where Y is the sum of personal incomes of parents
and child, and C is non-durable consumption). Taking the ratio of saving to income
creates problems with zero or negative income observations. The alternative deﬁnition we
adopt is due to Attanasio [3]: it is a monotonic transformation of the standard deﬁnition
when income is positive and consumption is a normal good.The saving rate here is deﬁned
as Y −C
C (where Y is total household income and C is non-durable consumption). For
consistency, we also take the ratio of the change in ﬁnancial wealth over time to C.
6. We have assumed that the following variables only aﬀect the exit probability and not the
saving behaviour: dummies indicating the perception of the housing situation by the child,
dummies indicating past changes in ﬁnancial situation and the gender of the child (females
are much more likely to leave earlier).
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